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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Three separate respondent briefs have been filed on behalf 
of three of the five non-appealing parties to the consolidated 
cases, that is, on behalf of parcels 2, 3 and 4 as shown in the 
diagram on page 5 of appellants1 brief. However, the only 
boundary in dispute in this appeal is that between parcel 1 
(Maxfield) and parcel 2 (Ainsworth), i.e. only Maxfield has 
appealed. The briefs of the other parties who do not have common 
boundaries with appellant and the factual matters surrounding the 
boundaries between them involve separate cases (although consoli-
dated and covered by the same summary judgment from which appel-
lant appeals). Nevertheless, said distant property owners 
(parcels 3 and 4), along with Ainsworth (parcel 2), have argued 
as if their boundaries were also in issue in this appeal, and 
that factual matters which may exist with respect to them are 
somehow controlling with respect to the Ainsworth/Maxfield 
boundary. Appellants disagree, but will nevertheless respond to 
all three briefs. 
Central to a decision in this appeal is the proper 
application of the principles laid down in the recent well 
reasoned decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Halladay v. 
Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 
360 (Utah 1984), and Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 
1
 All references herein to parcel numbers refer to said 
diagram of the properties on page 5 of appellants' brief filed 
August 20, 1987. 
1984). One of the respondent briefs (Jensen/Holmes, parcel 4) 
has asked the Supreme Court to overrule these cases, thereby 
becoming the first of the respondents to recognize that the 
decision of the lower court has failed to follow said precedents 
and that it would be necessary that they be overruled for 
respondents to prevail. Although appellants agree that 
consistency requires that said 1984 precedents be overruled if 
the summary judgment of the lower court is to be upheld, 
appellants disagree that the inconsistency should be resolved in 
such a manner. On the contrary, close scrutiny of said 
precedents shows that they have been carefully considered, are 
correct, and should be followed. 
Notwithstanding the obvious inconsistencies in the ruling of 
the District Court with the rule of law laid down in the Halla-
day, Stratford and Parsons cases, the other two respondent briefs 
(Ainsworths, parcel 2, and Staker, parcel 3) have continuned to 
argue as they did at the summary judgment hearing that the ruling 
of the lower court is somehow consistent with the above cases. 
To do so it has been necessary for them to bring Ln irrelevant 
and redundant matters, argue facts that don't exist, stretch 
interpretations beyond reason and, in essence, confuse the issues 
in their attempt to uphold the judgment of the lower court. All 
of the respondent briefs contain misstatements of fact and 
inuendos which appear to be done to prejudice appellants and this 
proceeding and draw attention away from the legal issues. In 
contrast, appellants submit the matter on the facts in the record 
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and the law in the above referenced 1984 precedents, which 
together show that appellants (the record owners) are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS APPEAL IS FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT AS IT AFFECTS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN MAXFIELD AND 
AINSWORTHS AND DOES NOT CONCERN THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
OTHER PARTIES IN THE CONSOLIDATED CASES. 
Appellants wish to clarify that it is immaterial to them 
whether or not the Supreme Court considers in this appeal the 
boundaries between other parties further south. For example, if 
parcel #4 (Jensen/Holmes) and parcel #3 (Staker) want to continue 
to litigate their boundaries in this appeal, or otherwise, it is 
of no interest to appellants, whose land is hundreds of feet 
north and shares no common boundaries with them. Appellants have 
neither the desire nor the right to tell those people where the 
boundaries between them should be. Yet, as shown in their 
briefs, they seem to feel they have a right to establish appel-
lants' boundaries. 
Respondents argue that in order to reverse the decision of 
the lower court with respect to the boundary between parcel #1 
and parcel #2, as appellants have urged, it is necessary to 
reverse the decision with respect to all of the parcels further 
south. As stated, it is immaterial to appellants if the decision 
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is reversed with respect to any or all of the other boundaries 
(i.e. those which are not common with appellants1 boundary), but 
respondents' claim that it must necessarily be an all or none 
situation cannot be sustained. 
It is elementary and needs no citation in the law that each 
separate boundary is a separate legal issue and that in such 
circumstances boundary by acquiescence might be established with 
respect to one of the boundaries, but not with respect to 
another. The cases were consolidated because of the similarity 
in issues and locations of the properties, but it would appear 
that respondents are insisting that the decision to consolidate 
the cases mandated that it would thereafter be impossible for the 
District Court, or the Supreme Court on appeal, to consider any 
differences there may be between the issues in the different 
cases and boundaries. 
Further in their attempt to confuse this issue, the 
respondent briefs make numerous references to factual matters 
which relate only to the boundaries between the non-appealing 
parties as if they somehow control the dispute between appellant 
Maxfield and respondent Ainsworth much further north. For 
example, there are some equitable considerations with respect to 
the Shane home which have been mentioned several times by the 
respondents. No doubt the fact that the record boundary line 
disects a home is of legitimate concern to the people whose 
boundaries are there involved, and perhaps that is one of the 
factors which influenced the lower court to rule in favor of the 
fence lines instead of the record boundary between those parties. 
But the point is this: The lower court's ruling on that boundary 
has not been appealed and is therefore not properly before the 
Supreme Courtf and even if it were, that situation has nothing to 
do with appellants' boundary hundreds of feet north (and with 
intervening landowners in between). 
In an attempt to refute appellants' argument on this point 
the respondent briefs cite with confidence the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision on the issue of cross appeal in Halladay v. 
Cluffy 739 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1987). Simply stated, said case 
doesn't stand for anything even close to what respondents have 
argued. 
That case involved a common boundary between adjoining 
landowners, not, as in the present appeal, consolidated cases 
involving various uncommon boundaries of various parcels con-
siderably distant from each other. That is, with respect to part 
of the boundary between Halladay and Cluff, the fence was on 
Cluff's side of the record boundary, and on another part it was 
on Halladay's side. The Utah Court of Appeals said, in effect, 
that the "whole" judgment as it related to the common boundary 
between Halladay and Cluff (not Bigelow, the other party) was 
appealed. It stands to reason, as held by the Court of Appeals, 
that Halladay could not win on one part of the common boundary 
with Cluff by "title-line decree" and win on the other part of 
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the common boundary with Cluff by "fence-line decree" through 
default because Cluff didn't file a cross appeal. In the present 
case, if both of Ainsworth's boundaries in which the record 
boundary doesn't match the fence line were with Maxfield, no 
cross appeal would be required. But they are not. If all 
respondents had common boundaries with the Maxfield property, no 
cross appeal would be necessary. They do not. The whole 
judgment as it relates to the Ainsworth/Maxfield boundary is 
brought before the Court. The other boundaries are not. 
The differences between the facts in the cited case (common 
boundary between two adjoining landowners) and the present case 
(consolidated cases involving various parties and boundaries not 
common with appellants' boundary) are obvious and dispositive. 
Clearly appellant has appealed the "whole" decision of the lower 
court only as it relates to one boundary, the Maxfield/ Ainsworth 
boundary. The other parties have failed to file timely cross 
appeals as they may relate to other boundaries of interest. The 
lower court, in effect, made six different judgments on six 
different boundaries involving a number of different parties. 
There were conflicting claims that involved some, but not all of 
the boundaries, attempting to explain why fences were placed 
where they were. The cases were consolidated under Rule 42 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in order to avoid unnecessary costs 
or delays, but the cases are not inextricably linked. The rule 
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provides for separate hearings or trials for separate issues or 
claims. 
In any event, neither the cited case nor any other case 
cited by any of the respondents can be said to stand for the 
proposition that factual matters relating to the boundaries 
several properties and hundreds of feet south are controlling 
with respect to the Maxfield/Ainsworth boundary. Yet the 
Jensen/Holmes brief (the one that seeks the overruling of the 
1984 landmark boundary by acquiescence cases) very confidently, 
but without citation of authority or other proposed rationale, 
states on page 3, line 20, that if appellants win, such a ruling 
would necessarily require dividing the Shane home on the record 
property line and on page 4, line 2, that appellants are "... 
stuck with the facts involving all property owners." These 
statements in the Jensen/Holmes brief are under the heading of 
"facts," not "argument," as if to suggest their truth is obvious 
and needs no supporting rationale. Obvious, yes; but obviously 
wrong. 
But why have these landowners distant from the disputed 
Maxfield/Ainsworth boundary made such an issue of this point? 
One would think that since they have said they are content with 
the fence line boundaries ruled by the lower court they would 
want to agree with appellants on this point in order to establish 
finality for their desired fence line boundaries and avoid the 
risk that the Supreme Court might overrule the summary judgment 
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as to all the boundaries because of failure to show objective 
uncertainty as to any of them. It doesn't make sense. Appel-
lants are not interested in changing the boundaries not common 
with theirs; so why are said distant respondents so interested in 
changing appellants' boundaries, even at the risk of drawing 
attention to the defects in their own boundary arguments? 
POINT II. RESPONDENTS' BRIEFS CONTAIN NUMEROUS MISSTATEMENTS 
OF FACT AND UNFOUNDED INUENDOS. ALTHOUGH MOST OF 
THESE ARE NOT RELEVANT OR ARE OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE 
OR NOT SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD, ETC., THEY CONFUSE THE 
ISSUES AND APPEAR TO BE INTERJECTED TO PREJUDICE 
APPELLANTS AND THIS PROCEEDING. 
This reply brief will make no attempt to reply to all of the 
erroneous facts and misleading statements in the three respondent 
briefs as they are too numerous to mention. It is respectfully 
requested, however, that before reliance is placed on any factual 
matters claimed in those briefs, the record should be checked for 
accuracy, foundation, etc., inasmuch as many of the statements 
make no attempt to cite the record, and many that do are mislead-
ing or are without foundation, constitute hearsay, etc. Inasmuch 
as this is an appeal from a summary judgment, it is of paramount 
importance that only admissible and uncontroverted facts be 
considered. 
Appellants believe that many of the unsupported items 
referred to in respondents' briefs are not relevant to the 
issues. Nevertheless, because they in some instances confuse the 
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issues or cast doubt on appellants1 motives, i.e., appear to be 
interjected to prejudice appellants, appellants will respond to 
some of them, as follows: 
1. Who gets the windfall? Respondents would have the Court 
believe that if the lower court is reversed, appellants would 
receive a windfall (R. 132), i.e., property they "never thought 
they had" (Jensen/Holmes brief, p. 13, line 10), and that 
- appellant "saw his chance to claim additional 
property" (Jensen/Holmes brief, p.2, line 19), 
- appellant made no claim to the disputed property prior 
to the litigation in 1985 (Ainsworth brief, p.11, line 
26; p. 15, last 3 lines; Jensen/Holmes brief, p.3, 
line 8), 
- "...a quitclaim deed instead of a warranty deed ... 
tells the whole story." (Staker brief, p.4, line 23). 
Clearly these statements have been made by respondents to 
give an unclear and unfair impression concerning Maxfield and his 
motives, and they do little, even if true, to assist in resolving 
the real legal issues in the appeal. They appear to be the up-
dated version of the same type of unfair and unwarranted asser-
tions respondents claimed in their previously filed motions for 
summary disposition where they erroneously speculated that 
because it was a quitclaim deed Maxfield hadn't paid anything for 
the land. 
There is not a shred of truth to the above assertions of 
respondents and others like them in their briefs. The true facts 
are as follows: 
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Grant S. Jensen states in his affidavit that at the time of 
the Holmes/Jensen purchase (parcel 4) from their predecessor, 
Lancaster, they had a survey made "so that we could have an 
accurate legal description of the property" (R. 120). According 
to the Conrad G. Maxfield affidavit, that survey could not be 
located for inspection by the parties, and so Maxfield arranged 
for a survey to be made to reconstruct the original survey 
description in the Lancaster deed to Jensen/Holmes (R. 167-
170). The survey (R. 403) shows that if record title prevails, 
Jensen/Holmes (parcel 4) will get all of the land described in 
their deed. If fence lines prevail, they will get all of the 
land described in their deed, plus about 90 feet north of the 
center of Section 12 not described in their deed, or a windfall 
of 1.8 acres less the Shane house and lot. 
The width of an ordinary section of land is 5,280 feet or 
one mile subject to slight variances that take into consideration 
the curvature of the earth. All of the properties in question 
(except the Shane house and lot) lay along the north-south line 
running through the center of Section 12. Surveyor Robert B. 
Jones states in his affidavit that the north half of the north-
south center line is 2,634.66 feet or 5.34 feet short. The south 
half of this north-south center line is 2,648 feet or 8 feet of 
excess (R. 180). 
Starting from the north end of the north-south center line, 
Utah National (the Maxfield property, parcel 1) through its 
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predecessors acquired 100 rods or 1650 feet; Ainsworth (parcel 2) 
acquired 30 rods or 495 feet; and Staker (parcel 3) through his 
predecessors acquired 30 rods or 495 feet (less the Yocum house 
and lot). The total deed distance is 2640 feet and there are 
2634.66 feet available. Jensen/Holmes acquired the next 1320 
feet along the north-south center line and according to survey 
(R. 403) there are 1319.75 feet available. Modern survey 
practice usually allocates any overage or shortage in a section 
prorata among the property owners. 
A fence line decision on all the properties gives a windfall 
to Jensen/Holmes (parcel 4) and shorts the Maxfield property 
(parcel 1). A record title decision gives everyone what is 
called for in their deeds and no one is shorted more than a tad. 
This should not be any surprise to Jensen/Holmes inasmuch as it 
is presumed that Jensen/Holmes have been aware of this since 
their purchase in 1961 from the results of their survey at that 
time (R. 120). 
Appellants respectfully submit that respondents' claims that 
Maxfield never thought he owned the disputed property, that he 
never made claim to it prior to the litigation, etc., have no 
foundation in fact and cannot be sustained. The record in this 
case is clearly to the contrary in that: 1) Maxfield acquired 
the property by a deed in 1972 (R. 135), and 2) shortly after his 
purchase of the property he notified Heber Ainsworth, predecessor 
to the Ainsworth property, of his claim to the property in 1972 
-12-
(R. 185). Off the record facts which establish that Maxfield has 
always made claim to the property include: 1) payment of the 
taxes on it since 1972 (the disputed property is in a separate 
tax notice), 2) payment of money for the property (a substantial 
amount in a purchase separate from the purchase of the undisputed 
portion of parcel 1), 3) correspondence with Ainsworths1 attor-
neys going back in excess of six years (well before this litiga-
tion arose), and 4) the fact that since purchasing the property 
in 1972 actual possession of the disputed property has not been 
significant in view of the uses of the property, i.e., all of the 
properites in the area are in close proximity to commercial 
development, which is the reason it was purchased by appellant in 
1972 (as an investment), and the importance of the fence line 
being one way or the other has no significance when occupancy of 
the land has little or no interim value while waiting for the 
commercial development. These facts do not appear in the record, 
but in view of the license taken by respondents in their briefs 
to speak out of the record, and the unfairness of attempting to 
establish thereby, and by their inuendos, that appellant has not 
made claim to the property prior to litigation, appellant feels 
justified in responding in kind. 
Also on the question of windfall, respondent Jensen/Holmes 
brief suggests (page 3, paragraph 4) that if the judgment of the 
lower court is reversed Maxfield will obtain a windfall in pro-
perties to the north. Here again is an example of respondents1 
attempts to confuse the issues of the case by speculating on 
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facts that are neither true nor have any relevance to the boun-
dary issue. It is true that appellant has acquired additonal 
properties north of that acquired in section 12, and this is true 
irrespective of the outcome of the within appeal. What isn't 
true is that it would be a windfall, that is, such additional 
properties obtained by appellant have been acquired through pay-
ment of cash. It is so obvious that Maxfieldfs having purchased 
lands north of section 12 has nothing to do with the within pro-
ceeding, appellants continue to be shocked each time respondents 
feel the need to bring it up and conjecture a supposed windfall. 
2. Record Title. Respondent Ainsworths1 brief, page 3, 
line 5 and page 15, line 13, challenges Maxfield's record title 
to the disputed property. On this point, appellants are con-
fident that respondents have made an oversight and don't really 
mean what they said. In the first paragraph on page 15 of the 
Ainsworth brief it is stated that the deed to Maxfield to the 
disputed property was for more property than Maxfield's grantor 
had received in his deed, that is, all of the disputed property 
is outside of Maxfield's and his grantor's chain of title. If 
that were true, there would be no need for this lawsuit. There 
has never been any question but that Maxfield is the record owner 
of the disputed property, and such is not in dispute. This 
statement in respondent Ainsworths' brief, if not an oversight, 
certainly is grasping for straws and demonstrates a willingness 
to say anything at all to confuse the real issues. Nevertheless, 
by way of response to this item, the record shows the following: 
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The Greenwood deed to iMaxfield's grantor, Teeples, (R. 134) 
conveys from the north line of Section 12 to a point 100 rods 
(1650 feet) south. The Teeples deed to Utah National (Maxfield) 
with respect to the southerly portion of parcel 1 (R. 135) begins 
1566.83 south of the section line and goes south another 83.39 
feet, a total of 1650.22 feet south of the section line. 
3. Is there really any relationship between the mistakes in 
the various boundaries of the properties? Respondents' would 
have the court believe that somewhere back in time, perhaps 1920 
or before, a survey or surveys were made which mistakenly used 
the witness monument instead of the actual section corner 
monument and that that is the cause of all of the shifting of 
fence lines from the true boundary lines on all the properties. 
The attempt in the respondent briefs is to portray a picture of 
fence lines consistently nearly exactly the same distance from 
the deed lines in the same direction with respect to all of the 
properties, thereby showing a probability of a mistaken survey, 
and indeed the same mistake with respect to all the properties. 
In their attempt to establish this concept they have referred 
extensively to statements in affidavits which would be inadmissi-
2 2 
ble as hearsay or without foundation, incorrectly quoted some, 
z
 See Ainsworth brief, page 8, concerning the Wanlass and 
Gardner affidavits and as repeated elsewhere numerous times in 
said brief. It is obvious from reading the affidavits that affi-
ants have not provided any foundational information to give 
credence to their speculation about possible prior surveys and 
fence lines. For further explanation see pp. 18, 19 of appel-
lants' prior brief. 
made general unsupported assertions (e.g. Ainsworth brief, p.8, 
line 24; Staker brief, p.11, paragraph 3 and p.8, line 14), and 
used a misleading diagram (i.e., the diagram on page 4 of the 
Jensen/Holmes brief fails to show the Yocum west deed line as 
east of the fence). 
This latter item, the misleading diagram, is of particular 
significance inasmuch as it is obvious that had the witness 
monument been used by mistake as conjectured by the respondents1 
briefs and affidavits, it being east and north of the actual 
monument (R. 164, 165, 193, 194), the fences would have been east 
and north, instead of west and north as shown in the Staker 
survey (R. 7). Furthermore, according to the official Salt Lake 
County Surveyor Area Reference Plat for Section 12, the 
north/south distance between the witness monument and the corner 
of Section 12 is only 33 feet, which hardly squares with the 75 
to 90 foot north/south discrepancies involved in the various 
properties in the consolidated cases. 
Appellants have fully discussed the alleged erroneous 
survey(s) in their prior brief and so will not burden this reply 
brief with further response concerning such. However the above 
discussion is included in view of the misleading information 
contained in the respondent briefs and to clarify that there has 
not been established, nor can there be established, any rela-
tionship concerning the mistakes in the boundaries of the various 
parties with any common denominator such as the alleged Rock 
survey based on a mistaken witness monument, or any other. 
Respondents1 belief to the contrary might be part of the source 
of their also mistaken belief that all boundaries for all the 
parties must be treated the same even though some have not 
appealed, they are not common to each other, and the facts are 
not the same with respect to each. Be that as it may, it just 
isn't so. The most that can be said is that the fences are north 
of the deed lines, but in varying amounts. Nothing is proved 
thereby one way or the other, and certainly the Staker survey (R. 
7) of the Yocum property is proof that the witness monument had 
nothing to do with it. 
4. Other Discrepancies,. As mentioned above, the 
discrepancies between the statements in respondents1 briefs and 
the actual record are too numerous to mention, but here follows a 
few examples to show the nature and type of such and the general 
unreliability of respondents' claims: 
Survey Markers. As proof that there were prior 
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erroneous surveys which were relied on in setting the fences, 
the Ainsworth brief on page 8, line 8, cites the affidavit of Lee 
Wanless that he found property corner markers on both ends of the 
fence between Ainsworth and Maxfield. Both the brief and the 
affidavit go on to say that such markers indicate that the fence 
lines at "one time" (R. 195) corresponded to boundary lines set 
forth by prior surveys. 
J
 See item 3, page 19, of appellants' prior brief for 
discussion that even if there had been such prior erroneous 
survey as speculated by respondents, it could not qualify as an 
"objective uncertainty." 
The above statements are true enough, but they are 
nevertheless very misleading and do not prove anything on behalf 
of respondents. If Mr, Wanlass had looked at the surveyor's name 
on the markers, he most likely would have been able to pinpoint 
that "one time" when the survey lines matched the fence lines* 
Since he didn't put that information in his affidavit, appellants 
will provide it, as follows: That "one time" was 1972, not 1890 
or 1920 as respondents would have the Court believe, and the name 
was Engineering Associates, Maxfield's surveyor who surveyed the 
property in 1972 in connection with his purchase. This informa-
tion is not in the record, but it is easily verifiable, and there 
is a good reason it isn't in the record. The Wanlass affidavit 
was the last one filed, and Maxfield was given no opportunity to 
file a response (said affidavit was to respond to Maxfield's 
affidavits, not introduce new items, R. 316). 
Whether or not the above information is in the record or 
even is the truth is not the point. The point is that the 
respondent briefs are filled with this type of misleading 
commentary and misapplication of statements in affidavits. Even 
without the above off the record information, those markers 
establish only that sometime somebody surveyed that fence line 
and nothing more. Obviously there would be no indication from 
the markers as to the surveyor's intent, and to presume, as 
respondents have, that their presence had anything to do with the 
placement of the fence, was done before or after, etc., was done 
- 1 f t -
in 1890 or 1920, etc., is just so much speculation; but even more 
than that, such is an indication of the kinds of arguments that 
have been resorted to in order to unfairly draw attention away 
from the real facts and issues. Appellants hope that the Supreme 
Court is sympathetic with appellants1 dilemma in not being able 
to answer all of respondents1 similar types of reasoning, 
misleading statements, misapplication of statements in the 
record, etc. without filing a 150 page reply brief. 
Location of the Fence. The Ainsworth brief, page 14, 
line 22, and in other places, cites the affidavit they obtained 
from Maxfield's grantor, Teeples, and states that a repair of the 
fence he did in 1956 was "on the same course as the original 
fence constructed in the 1890ls." This is gross misrepresenta-
tion of what the affidavit really says. With respect to the 
fence repair, it is just the opposite. The affidavit says he 
made the repair to the north' of where the prior fence had washed 
out, not in the same place. And as to how long the prior fence 
had been there, he didn't say the 1890fs, but said specifically 
that he didn't know. 
Another gross misrepresentation concerning the fences is 
seen on page 3, line 5, (Ainsworth brief) and p. 17, line 7 
(Staker brief) wherein it is stated that fences were replaced (or 
He says "slightly to the north" (R. 139). The Maxfield 
affidavit is more specific: "15 to 20 feet north" (R. 139). 
not contested) in the same prior locations despite a 1953 or 1956 
survey showing the fences were not on the survey lines. Appel-
lants are not certain of the significance claimed by respondents, 
but whatever it may be, the facts cited aren't so. There is 
nothing in the record about any such surveys (nor are appellants 
aware of any such off the record), and if respondents have such, 
they have made no attempt to submit them and there is no 
indication on or off the record that any predecessor in interest 
such as Teeples had any knowledge of them when he reconstructed 
the fence in 1956. There seems to be no limit to respodents1 
ability to produce prior surveys by conjecture and supposition, 
and in this instance out of thin air. 
Yocum Home. The Staker brief states on page 5 that the 
Yocums (within parcel 3) would lose their house if appellant 
wins. In the first place problems with the boundaries of this 
lot and home totally surrounded by Staker (parcel 3) for sure are 
not relevant to the Maxfield/Ainsworth boundary, subject of this 
appeal (see Point I, above). Such could only have relevance to 
matters between Yocum and Staker. Secondly, Staker through 
counsel has on two occasions represented to the lower court their 
willingness to take either the fence line or the record title 
line (R. 98, R. 252). The Yocum house and lot in the center of 
the Staker property has a neglible impact on the Staker property 
whether by fence line or by boundary line. This would be one of 
the easiest problems for the court to resolve. Yet once again, 
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respondents can't resist throwing up this type of parade of 
horrors, i.e., somebody is going to lose their house, and stating 
it as a fact when it isn't, in order to confuse the real issues 
in the appeal and attempt to set somebody else's boundaries not 
common with their own (the Maxfield/Ainsworth boundary). 
While on this subject, appellants wish to reiterate that 
even if there are some equitable problems created by a decision 
favoring the record titles: (1) they are not that difficult to 
solve consistent with record titles (see paragraph 4, page 22 of 
appellants' prior brief), and (2) in prior cases such problems 
have not deterred the Supreme Court from rejecting boundary by 
acquiescence where otherwise rejection was required, i.e., 
structures and improvements on property lost by occupants to 
record title holders as listed in the briefs filed in the three 
above cited 1984 boundary cases (R. 152) include a turkey shed, 
chicken coops, a potato pit, gardens, fruit trees, part of a fish 
pond enclosed by a seven-foot chain link fence, and a horse 
training track constructed of: pipe and wood. 
Reasonably Available Survey Information. The Staker 
brief, page 13, line 20, badly distorts the ruling of the 
Halladay case by saying the test laid down in that case is a 
"reasonably available survey," with the implication that since 
there wasn't a reasonably available survey, the fence lines 
should prevail. But the Halladay case requires only that 
reasonably available survey information be available, not the 
survey itself (685 P.2d at 504). There is a vast difference 
between the two. 
Rural Area? The respondent briefs' implications that 
the property in question is rural farm land (Staker brief, page 
8, line 1; Jensen/Holmes brief, page 12, line 3) does not square 
with the Staker affidavit of value of $60,000 per acre (R. 226), 
the Ainsworth affidavit of value of $85,000 per acre5; and the 
Jensen affidavit at $60,000 per acre.5 The property is in Sandy 
City. It cannot be any more rural than the property along Big 
Cottonwood Creek in the Salt Lake County Stratford v. Morgan case 
(689 P.2d 360, 1984). 
Appellants respectfully submit that respondents have mis-
understood the discussions in Halladay relative to the signif-
icance of whether land is urban or rural. The real significance 
is whether survey information is reasonably available (685 P.2d 
at 504), and it would simply be more likely to be so (but not 
conclusively so) the closer the property is to urban areas. 
For example, when Maxfield purchased the property in 1972 as 
an investment, it was just a pasture or field, (i.e., "rural" in 
appearance). It is the same today and no doubt was the same a 
hundred years ago. But this "rural" property, whether it be 
1987, 1972, 1920, or 1890, has always been close to the developed 
areas of the State of Utah, i.e., it is centrally located in the 
D
 The page numbers for these references are not numbered in 
the record but are found in the unnumbered pages following R. 236. 
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Salt Lake Valley (always the most populous area of the state) is 
only a few miles south of the intersection of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and in fact the east line of Section 12 (which 
contains all of the properties in the consolidated cases) is part 
of the Salt Lake Meridian. It is difficult to imagine any place 
where survey information would be more reasonably available than 
right along the meridian line! 
In view of the easy access to survey information since 1856, 
nearly 40 years prior to the earliest suggestion of when the 
fences may have been set (R. 176, see also discussion on page 16 
of appellants' prior brief), respondents' commentary as to the 
"rural" nature of the property can avail them nothing. The 
"rural" nature of the property in 1972 didn't stop Maxfield from 
using the reasonably available survey information to survey his 
property at the time of his purchase. Likewise, in 1961 the same 
"rural" nature didn't dissuade Jensen/Holmes from using the same 
reasonably available survey information to survey their property 
at the time of their purchase (R. 120). The point is, whether 
1961, 1972 or a hundred years ago, the land hasn't changed (still 
"rural") and neither has the available survey information. No 
doubt the value of the land has increased with time, as has the 
cost of a survey, presumably in approximately the same ratios. 
But whether or not that be the case is unimportant in view of the 
always close and readily available survey information. 
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lines. In theory, such may well be the case, that is, no doubt 
there are numerous such potential situations throughout the State 
of Utah. But, unfortunately, with all their published articles 
and analyses, the critics have missed the point and plain meaning 
of the very well reasoned opinions of the Court (e.g. 685 P.2d at 
504, 505) on this issue. The question isn't how many potential 
situations there may be, but how many of the potential situations 
will likely become lawsuits. Under the present rule of law, a 
great many more of those potential situations will be eliminated 
before they even get close to the point of litigation because 
lawyers will advise their clients that since they can't show an 
objective uncertainty or dispute, they don't have a case. 
Consider these two scenarios: 
Under the rule argued by the critics, i.e., without 
the objective test: A says to B, "My recent survey shows 
your fence is on my property." B says, "It's been there 40 
years, so go jump in the lake." Result: Litigation. 
Under the Supreme Court's 1984 rulings, i.e., with 
the objective test: Same facts, and no objective uncertain-
ty or dispute provable. Result: The parties will know they 
must rely on the deed lines, and therefore the fence will be 
moved voluntarily or the parties will agree to exchange 
quitclaim deeds. There will be no need for litigation 
because there are no issues. 
The Supreme Court's formula is straight forward and correct: 
Reduce the number of potential issues and the potential for 
litigation is correspondingly reduced. 
The goal of our judicial system, of course, is not to reduce 
litigation, but to promote justice. Here again, the Supreme 
Court's formula gets all the high marks, notwithstanding its 
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Interestingly enough, in the present case there is no reason 
to feel sorry for those who could have, but failed to. These 
parties didn't fail. As pointed out in the Staker brief, of the 
four parcels the two in the middle (Ainsworth, parcel 2, and 
Staker, parcel 3) will not gain or lose significantly regardless 
of whether the fence line or the record title prevails, and the 
other two (Maxfield, parcel 1, and Jensen/Holmes, parcel 4) both 
did at the time of their purchases what the Supreme Court in 
Halladay said purchasers of land are expected to do, that is, 
each located their boundaries by survey. So a record title 
decision in this matter (if as respondents argue, it must cover 
all or none of the parcels) isn't going to take any land from 
Jensen/Holmes within their fences that they didn't already know, 
from the time of their purchase in 1961 when they surveyed it (R. 
120), was not in their record title. 
Is boundary by acquiescence dead in Utah? A first year law 
student reading the Balladay opinion would have no difficulty 
answering "No." Yet respondents and the learned critics seem to 
think that if the Court again follows the said 1984 cases by 
reversing the lower court in this appeal, it will be tantamount 
to annihilation of the doctrine. Appellants' comment is simply 
this: This type of argument is always used when one is not able 
to fit his case into the mold. When this happens the common 
desparation reaction is accuse the court of destroying the mold. 
Well, once again, it just isn't so. The mold is alive and well, 
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appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 
the undisputed material facts show that appellants are the record 
owners of the disputed property and that objective uncertainty or 
dispute has not been, nor can be, shown. On these issues all 
information is before the Court. However, should the Court over-
rule its said recent decisions, it would be necessary to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court because of genuine issues of 
material fact concerning other elements of boundary by acquie-
scence (see Point II of appellants' prior brief). 
Appellants have respectfully urged herein that the Supreme 
Court uphold its prior rulings because they are correct and 
discourage litigation. The Court's opinions in Halladay, 
Stratford, and Parsons carefully reviewed the confusion of prior 
law, the controlling principles, and all other material factors 
and settled once and for all these difficult questions associated 
with fence line vs. record boundaries in a way that provides for 
greater stability, predictability, and reliance on record titles 
and conveyance statutes. This substantial effort and 
accomplishment should not be overruled. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 1987. 
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